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ARTICLES
GETTING BLOOD FROM STONES: RESULTS AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF CHILD
SUPPORT PRACTICE IN ST. JOSEPH COUNTY, INDIANA PATERNITY
ACTIONS
Margaret F. Brinig and Marsha Garrison

Today, there is consensus that the current system of allocating and enforcing child support obligations does not work well for
disadvantaged families, most of which are nonmarital. Nonmarital children are less likely to have support orders established
than marital children, and they are much less likely to experience full payment. In this article, we report data on child support
awards and enforcement associated with a sample of paternity actions brought in 2008 or 2010 in St. Joseph County,
Indiana. We found that child support practice in St. Joseph County promotes limited contact between children and their
absent fathers, nonpayment of prior support obligations, and the accrual of arrears that can never be paid. These results
strongly support recent changes in federal child support regulations and programs that postdate the orders in our study. Our
results also demonstrate both the need for additional reforms and the difﬁculties that lie ahead as the states begin to grapple
with applying the new standards.
Key Points for the Family Court Community:
• Child support enforcement among the very disadvantaged neither makes fathers more responsible nor collects signiﬁcant money
• It also makes contact with their children less likely and results in the amassing of arrearages that will never be paid
• While recent federal legal changes move in the right direction, we fear that local agencies are still unable to calculate
incomes when none can be shown, and, as with credit for other paid support orders, resort to shortcuts that are inaccurate and unproductive
Keywords:

Child Support; Child Support Enforcement; Empirical Research; Indigent Fathers; Nonmarital Children; Paternity; Poverty; and Unmarried Parents.

Today, there is consensus that the current system of calculating and enforcing support obligations does not work well for disadvantaged families, most of which are nonmarital. Nonmarital children are less likely to have support orders established than marital children, and they are much less
likely to experience full payment.
In this article, we report data on parenting time, child support calculation, and enforcement
actions in a population of nonmarital children for whom paternity actions were brought in 2008 or
2010 in St. Joseph County, Indiana. The computerized, court-based record system we utilized to
collect data gave us access to information on parental characteristics and child outcomes that other
researchers investigating child support practice in disadvantaged populations have been unable to
access. Our research thus offers an unusually data-rich window into current outcomes in a population where problems are large and new solutions are desperately needed. Our ﬁndings demonstrate
that recent changes in federal child support regulations and programs, which postdate the orders in
our study, were very much needed. Our ﬁndings also demonstrate the need for additional reforms
and the difﬁculties that lie ahead as the states begin to grapple with applying the new standards.
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT, AIMS, AND RESULTS OF U.S. CHILD SUPPORT POLICY
Ensuring that child support orders are entered and enforced against nonresident, “deadbeat”
fathers1 has been a guiding principle of U.S. support law for the past half century. Current law and
practice generally derives from a federal initiative, inaugurated in 1975, designed to raise support
values and increase the likelihood that a support award would be paid. This initiative stemmed from
sharp increases both in the number of single-parent families2 and in the cost of public assistance to
these families.3 Due to similar demographic shifts and increased public-assistance burdens, many
other industrialized nations initiated comparable changes in child support law and practice during
the same period.4
The ﬁrst major U.S. legislation, enacted by Congress in 1975, established the federal Ofﬁce of
Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) and required the states to create their own child support
enforcement agencies as a condition of receiving reimbursement for public assistance to needy children and their families (Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC]).5 The new federal law
required parents (typically mothers) applying for AFDC beneﬁts to assign their child support claims
to the state as a condition of receiving assistance. It required the new support agencies (popularly
described as IV-D agencies because they originated in Title IV-D of the federal Social Security
Act) to establish support obligations for absent parents of federal-supported children, collect support
from those parents, and provide a parent-locator service equipped to search state and local records
for information on parents who could not be found. To reduce applications for public assistance,
the 1975 law also made IV-D services available to all parents who paid a reasonable fee.
The 1975 requirements were expanded by the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984
(CSEA)6 and Family Support Act of 1988.7 These new laws required the states to change the method
by which child support orders were calculated. Support determination had previously relied primarily
on judicial discretion to produce an award value; under the new federal rules, states were required to
adopt guidelines that took into account “all earnings and income of the absent parent” and used “speciﬁc descriptive and numeric criteria” to produce a presumptive award value.8 CSEA also required
the states to add new enforcement weapons to their arsenals, including immediate wage withholding,
the imposition of liens against nonpaying obligors, the deduction of unpaid support from federal and
state income tax refunds, and statutes of limitation permitting the establishment of paternity up to
eighteen years after a child’s birth. This package of requirements was further expanded by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,9 which mandated innovations in paternity establishment, expanded informational resources used for parent locating, required
certain expedited procedures for routine cases, and provided funds for programs to improve unemployed fathers’ job prospects and to support fathers’ access to their children.
In response to these various federal mandates, state child support law and practice have shifted
dramatically. Before the 1975 law was enacted, parents seeking support were invariably forced to
ﬁnd the obligor parent themselves and to pay for legal assistance in establishing and/or enforcing a
support award; today, 50–60% of all support orders are obtained through the IV-D program.10
Before federally required innovations in paternity establishment, paternity was often not established;
indeed, in 1979, the ratio of paternities established by IV-D ofﬁces to the number of nonmarital
births was .19.11 Today, paternity is established in 100% of IV-D cases.12 The shift in law and practice has also dramatically increased child support collections. In ﬁscal year 1977, state IV-D agencies served fewer than a million cases and collected less than $1 billion. In ﬁscal year 2015, these
same agencies served nearly 16 million children and collected $28.6 billion.13
Increased child support collections serve a range of goals. Child support payments lift approximately a million family members out of poverty every year.14 Because of child support’s positive
effects on labor supply, welfare participation, fertility, and marriage decisions, every dollar of support paid also lifts the household income of recipient families by a much larger amount.15 Moreover, because fathers who pay child support are more likely to spend time with their children,16 it is
possible that the federal child support program has increased parent–child contact for at least some
children.17
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Despite these successes, the likelihood of neither a formal child support order nor full payment
has increased. In 1979, when the ﬁrst federal survey of child support awards was published, 59.1%
of mothers eligible to receive child support had obtained support orders, and about half of those
awarded support received full payment.18 In 2014, 53.1% of eligible mothers had a court order or
some type of agreement to receive ﬁnancial support from the noncustodial parent(s), and 46.2%
received full payment.19 In inﬂation-adjusted dollars, the average value of a support award actually
declined from $5,866 in 1978 to $3,936 in 2014.20
The reason for the seeming anomaly of vastly increased child support collections but lower
award rates and values is a substantial increase in single-parent families. Between 1975 and 2016,
the number of U.S. single-parent families increased from 4.9 to 11 million.21 The percentage of
U.S. children living with a single parent also increased, from 17% in 1975 to 26.8% in 2015.22
This increase in single-parent households—the type eligible for child support—was initially
driven, in part, by a rising divorce rate. But the U.S. divorce rate in recent years has leveled off and
even declined for college-educated couples.23 The continuing increase in the proportion of singleparent households is thus due to a dramatic rise in nonmarital parenting. In 1970, 11% of
U.S. births were nonmarital24; in 2015, 40.3% of U.S. births took place outside of marriage.25
Nonmarital relationships are much less stable than marital relationships, and they tend to terminate more quickly. In the United States, children born to unmarried parents are about three times as
likely to see their parents separate before the age of ﬁve as are children born to married parents.26
Moreover, as compared to married fathers, unmarried fathers are, on average, younger when their
ﬁrst child is born,27 less well educated,28 and have lower income.29 They are less likely to be in the
labor force than married fathers30 and more likely to be members of a racial or ethnic minority.31
Today’s population of support obligors contains a high percentage of disadvantaged men with
deeply impaired capacity to adequately support their children. Indeed, based on a 1998 survey,
researchers calculated that one-third of nonresident, unmarried U.S. fathers lived in a household
with income below the poverty line.32 Given declining male wages for all but the college-educated
over the past twenty years,33 the proportion of support obligors who are poor may be even higher
today.
The low capacity of unmarried fathers to pay support is exacerbated by the fact that they are far
more likely than married fathers to have children with more than one mother. Researchers have
found that men unmarried when their ﬁrst child is born are three to four times as likely to have children with additional partners as compared to fathers married at the birth of their ﬁrst child.34
Multiple-partner fertility (MPF) translates into multiple support obligations, much harder to meet
than just one.
An accumulating body of evidence has also revealed that the current system for assessing and
collecting child support does not work well for low-income obligors. First, support orders typically
require poor obligors to pay a much higher income percentage than that mandated for higherincome obligors.35 For example, one survey found that 28% of poor fathers were required to pay
half or more of their incomes in child support.36 Such almost-impossible-to-meet obligations result
primarily from state rules that impose minimum support obligations37 or impute income to unemployed parents.38 Both types of rules are common; in 2013, approximately half of the states had
support guidelines that mandated a minimum payment obligation,39 and all states permit income
imputation.
Unsurprisingly, high-percentage support obligations produce nonpayment. Researchers have
found that both the percentage of current support collected and payment consistency signiﬁcantly
decline when an obligor is required to pay more than 20% of his gross income.40 They have also
found that support orders based on ﬁctional, imputed income will most likely yield $0 in total payments during the year after the order was entered.41
In many states, noncustodial parents whose children receive federally funded public assistance
beneﬁts also have reduced incentives to pay support because whatever they do pay goes directly to
the state and will not beneﬁt their children. Despite strong evidence that policies under which an
obligor’s support is passed through to the residential parent without a reduction in public beneﬁts
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increase children’s support without reducing parental workforce participation or producing large
public costs,42 about half of the states retain all support payments they collect from obligors whose
children receive public assistance.43
To avoid paying the state, many low-income obligors make in-kind contributions to their children.44 In surveys, 40–50% of low-income mothers eligible for child support report in-kind contributions from fathers.45 The value of these contributions is often signiﬁcant, particularly in view of
fathers’ low incomes.46 But these contributions do not count in the formal support system.
Thus, low-income obligors are responsible for the bulk of unpaid child support. Indeed, in one
nine-state study, 70% of unpaid child-support debt was owed by parents with incomes of $10,000
per year or less.47 Many of these low-income obligors are unemployed. In another survey, only
34% worked full time, and only 8% worked full time throughout the year; 41% (excluding those
incarcerated) had not worked at all during the prior year.48
When a support obligor is not working, wage withholding—which accounted for three-quarters
of all child support collections in 201549—cannot ensure that he makes payments. The problem of
collection is particularly acute for men who have been incarcerated.50 Although the proportion of
currently incarcerated noncustodial parents in state and federal prisons is only about 5% of the total
IV-D caseload, 30–40% of cases state ofﬁces describe as “hard to collect” involve a noncustodial
parent with a criminal record.51
Because low-income parents with arrears often have no assets that can be attached or wages that
can be garnished, IV-D agencies have typically employed the threat of jail—civil contempt
proceedings—as a means of collection.52 Although we lack hard data on either the number of contempt petitions ﬁled by IV-D agencies or the proportion of these petitions targeted at obligors
unable to pay, commentators have generally concluded both that contempt is routinely used when
wage withholding is unavailable and that most of those who go to jail are unable to pay.53
Mounting evidence of the disproportionate support burden borne by low-income parents has led
some critics to argue that support nonpayment results more from dads being “dead broke” than
“deadbeat.”54 Not all of the evidence supports the hypothesis that low income drives support nonpayment; for example, researchers have found that fathers are more likely to pay support, both formally and informally, if they are in continued contact with their children.55 But it is now clear that
low income, unrealistic support obligations, and lack of payment incentives all play a major role in
obligors’ failure to pay.
In recent years, the OCSE has responded to the accumulating research on nonpayment and obligor poverty with several new initiatives. To reduce payment disincentives for children supported by
public assistance, the Deﬁcit Reduction Act of 2005 required the federal government to share in the
cost of child support collections for children supported by public assistance that was passed through
to custodial parents.56
New child-support regulations that became effective in 2017 address the problem of ﬁctional,
imputed income and civil contempt.57 The new regulations require IV-D agencies to base support
obligations on “the speciﬁc circumstances of the noncustodial parent”; the OCSE’s interpretive
memo speciﬁes that, under this standard, “[i]mputing income will need to be done on a case-bycase basis, when there is an evidentiary gap.”58 The regulations also address excessive use of civil
contempt by requiring agencies to determine whether a support obligor has the “actual and present”
ability to pay his support obligation as a precondition to ﬁling a contempt petition and to provide
the relevant court with information regarding such ability.59
Since 2012, the OCSE has also funded a number of demonstration projects aimed at helping
low-income fathers gain the capacity to meaningfully support their children.60 This initiative is
based on research showing that child-support-linked employment programs are more likely than
others to yield positive results for support obligors and their children.61 Evaluation of these OCSE
programs has not yet been completed, but a review of other child-support-linked employment programs found that some strategies had promising effects on the employment and earnings of lowincome adults.62 The effects were extremely modest, however, and surveys suggest that many poor
obligors face major barriers in obtaining employment. In one survey, 41% lacked a high school
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diploma, a quarter had a health condition that limited their capacity to work, and 16% were institutionalized, mostly in prison.63 Designing programs that work for obligors so multiply disadvantaged
will be a challenging task.

II.

OUR STUDY SITE AND SAMPLE

Our study focuses on 688 paternity actions brought in St. Joseph County, Indiana during 2008
and 2010.64 For these cases, the court-based record system that we obtained judicial permission to
access provided us with extraordinarily rich and detailed information about focal children (the oldest born to parents named in the paternity order) and their families. Unusually (perhaps uniquely),
the record system provides clickable links to other family court records for parents and their children. Using this system, we were able to access detailed information on initial child support awards,
award modiﬁcation and enforcement, the allocation of parenting time and legal custody, orders of
protection, child maltreatment reports and ﬁndings, juvenile status and delinquency charges, and
the child’s and parents’ addresses and moves. The court records also enabled us to determine if the
focal child’s parents had children with other partners and, most of the time, both the number of
other partners involved and the total number of children the parent had with those partners. For
half-siblings living in St. Joseph County, we were able to access the same information available for
focal children and their siblings. The same information was available for parents if the parent lived
in St. Joseph County during his/her minority. For children and parents with a history of court
involvement, the ﬁles also contained case notes. For example, we could typically see the results of
drug tests, the number and duration of residential placements, school history (truancy, expulsion,
behavioral problems), family background (parents involved in crime, family receives welfare, etc.),
and the child’s mental and emotional state (suicide precautions, risk of violence, known substance
abuse). Using other databases, we were also able to determine whether parents had adult criminal
records, if they had been incarcerated, and, most of the time, the charges that produced imprisonment. In sum, the database from which we obtained case information offered the opportunity to
look at child support practice in an unusually detailed way.
The study site, St. Joseph County, Indiana, is also an excellent location in which to examine the
calculation and enforcement of child support for nonmarital children. The demography of
St. Joseph County is fairly consistent with that of the United States as a whole except that it is
somewhat poorer and has a lower proportion of Hispanic and foreign-born residents.65 St. Joseph
County also offers extremes. It is home to the University of Notre Dame, a prestigious school with
more than 1,000 full-time faculty members and a large professional staff. It also contains South
Bend (population around 100,000), a once-thriving hub of manufacturing employment that is now,
like most of the American rust belt, struggling with a massive decline in stable, blue-collar employment. Most Notre Dame faculty and staff live in or near St. Joseph County, creating a large base of
well-educated, well-paid citizens. But South Bend also has entrenched pockets of deep poverty. In
2015, The Economist reported that “[t]he city’s unemployment rate remains in the low double digits;
28% of its inhabitants live below the poverty line and 75% of children in public schools are eligible
for the free lunches offered to low-income families.”66 St. Joseph County is thus a place that, in the
aggregate, is pretty average. But its averages mask large contrasts and, reﬂecting these contrasts,
crime, unemployment, poverty—and the families we studied—are highly concentrated in some
neighborhoods.67
Our sample, composed exclusively of unmarried parents, reﬂects the demographic variables—
youth, membership in a racial minority, MPF, and low income—associated with nonmarital birth.68
Fathers’ median age at the birth of the focal child was 25.0 years; mothers’ median age was 22.2.69
Fully 51% of sample fathers for whom race information was available were African American,70
more than four times the proportion of African Americans in St. Joseph County generally.71 We
found that 56.8% of mothers and 47.8% of fathers had at least one child with another partner.72
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Indeed, thirteen mothers and ﬁfteen fathers were parties to two (or, in one case, three) paternity
actions.73
Median family income for the sample was $27,248 per year, well below the $42,316 St. Joseph
County median74; only 25% of sample parents had combined incomes exceeding $30,680 per year.
As one would expect, individual parental incomes were also low. The median paternal income was
$13,624 per year. In 5.9% of cases, the father had a listed income of zero dollars,75 and 25% had
incomes of $12,168 per year or less. Maternal incomes were quite similar. Median maternal income
was, again, $13,624 per year; 6.7% of mothers had listed incomes of zero dollars; and 25% had
incomes of $12,168 per year or less.
African American incomes lag behind those of non-Hispanic Whites nationally.76 This was also
true in the study population, at least for men. Fathers’ incomes varied signiﬁcantly by their own
race/ethnicity77 and that of the mother.78 Mothers’ incomes did not vary signiﬁcantly by either the
father’s or the mother’s race/ethnicity; only the mother’s identiﬁcation as non-Hispanic White was
signiﬁcantly correlated with her income.79
A very high percentage of both mothers and fathers also had incomes that are highly likely to be
imputed. Indeed, this is why the median income of mothers and fathers in the lowest income quartiles are identical. Although the Indiana Supreme Court has disallowed the practice of imputing
income when a parent is incarcerated,80 the Indiana Support Guidelines in effect when support
orders in the cases we studied were entered permit income imputation in a range of other circumstances. More speciﬁcally, although the guidelines speciﬁed that income imputation “may be inappropriate … when a parent … suffers from a debilitating mental illness, a debilitating health issue,
or is caring for a disabled child,” and “when a custodial parent with young children at home has no
signiﬁcant skills or education and is unemployed,” they also encourage income imputation for most
unemployed parents. Under the guidelines,
[e]ven though an unemployed parent has never worked before, potential income should be considered
for that parent if he or she voluntarily remains unemployed without justiﬁcation [and] …
[w]hen a parent is unemployed by reason of involuntary layoff or job termination, it still may be appropriate to include an amount in gross income representing that parent’s potential income. . . . 81

Although the guidelines state that “potential income shall be [assessed] … by determining employment potential and probable earnings level based on the obligor’s work history, occupational qualiﬁcations, prevailing job opportunities, and earnings levels in the community,”82 they also specify
that, in the absence of “any other evidence of potential earnings,” the “federal minimum wage
should be used in calculating potential income for that parent.”83 The guidelines currently in effect
suggest a somewhat more discretionary approach, specifying that “[p]otential income equivalent to
the federal minimum wage may be attributed to that parent.”84
In our sample, approximately half (47.1% of fathers, 55.9% of mothers) of parents whose
incomes were recorded had listed income that was likely imputed85; 39.2% of fathers and 47.4% of
mothers had listed incomes representing the value of the minimum wage for the year in question
multiplied by forty hours.86 An additional 7.9% of fathers and 8.5% of mothers had listed incomes
of $104 per week, a value representing one-half of the federal poverty-level income for a single person. This lower-value imputed income was introduced by the local IV-D agency in 2010. The
unwritten policy authorizes the lower value when a parent has a known substance-abuse problem,
impaired work ability due to a medical problem, a felony record, and when s/he lacks both a high
school diploma or GED degree and an employment history.87 Prior to 2010, the minimum-wage
value was invariably used to measure imputed income when there was no basis for a higher ﬁgure.
The evidence from our sample thus strongly suggests that the Support Guidelines’ command to
“consider” income imputation has had the effect, in St. Joseph County, of producing automatic
income imputation for individuals who are not working or not working ofﬁcially. The ﬁles also
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suggest an “either-or” decision: if the parent was not working, the minimum-wage imputation value
was assigned unless the IV-D attorney concluded (after 2010) that the $104 ﬁgure was appropriate.
The father’s history of incarceration and his history of drug/alcohol abuse, the two stated decisionmaking factors on which we typically had case information, were both signiﬁcantly correlated with
wage imputation at the $104 level.88 However, the case ﬁles contained absolutely no information on
parents’ education level, work history, or job training. Therefore, we cannot fully assess how consistently the lower value was applied.
The father-obligor’s having likely imputed income at the minimum-wage level was positively and
signiﬁcantly related to the imputation of income to the mother at that level, the father’s African
American race,89 and his having failed to appear at the paternity establishment hearing. It was negatively related to a 2010 petition year, the mother’s residence in St. Joseph County at or before age
fourteen, the father’s receipt of disability beneﬁts or being incarcerated, and mediator
involvement.90
However, these variables explained only 22–30% of case variance (see Table 1).91
In cases of imputed income, we have no way of knowing how much income the parent to whom
income was imputed actually earns. He may be working off the books (engaged in activities that are
legal or illegal), but the resources from which child support might come are, at best, speculative.
The high level of income imputation in our sample suggests a high level of poverty. But given
that both mothers and fathers often lived in complex households that included children from other
relationships and new partners with children from earlier relationships, it is close to impossible to
estimate how many parents and children lived below the poverty line.
We can say that the vast majority of sample families had incomes well below what would be
needed for self-sufﬁciency. The Indiana Self-Sufﬁciency Calculator, developed by the Indiana Institute for Working Families, captures “the income working families need to meet their basic necessities without private or public assistance.”92 In St. Joseph County in 2016, a family composed of
one adult and one preschool-age child needed a $17.91 hourly wage—$33,300 per year in $2009—
to achieve self-sufﬁciency, well above the $27,248 median total income of sample parents.
Another clue to the sample’s poverty rate is the large proportion—95.3%—who were in the IVD program. IV-D involvement is mandatory where a child is receiving federal welfare beneﬁts or is
in foster care, both strongly linked to poverty. And, while use of the IV-D program is optional, services are not limited to those who are low income; surveys show that parents who are poor, never
married, young, and poorly educated are much more likely to receive IV-D services than others.
Nationally, in 2010, 52% of parents in the IV-D program had family incomes below 150% of the
poverty line, 47% were never married, 30% were under thirty years of age, and 12% had a college
degree. By contrast, only 28% of non-IV-D families had comparable low incomes; only 27% were
never married, 16% were under age thirty, and 24% had a college degree. Reﬂecting these divergent
Table 1
Predictors of Paternal Income Imputed at Minimum Wage (Father Required to Pay Support,
N = 621)
Variable
Father is African American
Father did not appear
Father incarcerated or disability recipient
Father’s total known moves
Focal child has half-sibling
Mother’s income imputed at minimum wage
Mediator involved
Mother in county from age 14
2010 petition year
Constant

B

Stand. Error

Wald

Signif.

Odds Ratio

.651
.896
−3.205
.079
.469
1.282
−1.960
.660
−.696
−2.306

.199
.331
.783
.023
.219
.198
.805
.210
.210
.301

10.711
7.329
16.766
12.290
4.573
41.953
5.927
9.917
10.955
58.559

.001
.007
<.001
<.001
.032
<.001
.015
.002
.001
<.001

1.917
2.450
.041
1.083
1.599
3.604
.141
1.935
.498
.100
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proﬁles, about two-thirds of IV-D recipients receive some sort of public assistance, as compared to
25% of the non-IV-D group.93 The IV-D population is also disproportionately composed of women
and parents of color. Nearly 90% are female, and close to half are either African American (27%)
or Hispanic (20%).94 Given the strong correlation between IV-D and disadvantage, it is unsurprising that, in our sample, IV-D status was signiﬁcantly and negatively correlated with both maternal
and paternal income.95
While the demographic characteristics of our sample are consistent with those of American nonmarital parents generally, the sample contains an even larger proportion of unstable relationships. In
the U.S. Fragile Families study, 35% of couples with a nonmarital child were still together after ﬁve
years.96 In our population, the median age of focal children (the ﬁrst born to this mother and father)
at the time a paternity/support order was entered was two years (average 3.6 years), and only 24.6%
of focal children were ﬁve years or older at order entry.97
Perhaps reﬂecting this high level of instability, in a very large proportion of sample cases, paternity was established through genetic testing at the time a paternity action was brought while, nationally, paternity is established consensually through an afﬁdavit of paternity signed by both parents in
the hospital at least 60% of the time.98 The court records typically did not permit us to determine
which parents cohabited and which did not, but the high rate of genetic testing also suggests a lower
rate of cohabitation than among the general pool of unmarried parents.
Given the lack of national data, we cannot draw comparisons between the sample and the larger
pool of nonmarital parents with respect to involvement with the child welfare system, family court,
and criminal justice system. But the parents we studied had a very high rate of such involvement.
Almost a quarter (23.8%) of sample mothers had one or more children who were the subject of a
substantiated child maltreatment report, 30.1% of fathers had been incarcerated, and 30.7% of
fathers had a record of alcohol or drug abuse. For fathers who lived in St. Joseph County by age
fourteen, 28.5% had at least one juvenile status (runaway, truancy, habitual disobedience, curfew
violations) record, and 50.2% had at least one juvenile delinquency arrest.
In sum, our study population is disproportionately composed of the most disadvantaged and
most fragile of nonmarital families, a group that is itself far more fragile and disadvantaged than
marital families.
III.

LEGAL CUSTODY AND PARENTING TIME: ALLOCATION PATTERNS AND
PREDICTABILITY

Support obligations typically follow the assignment of primary residential care, alternately
described as primary physical custody. When the mother obtains primary custody, the father is the
support obligor, and vice versa. If the child lives with both parents a signiﬁcant amount of the time,
child support obligations may be eliminated entirely or the higher-income parent may obtain a signiﬁcant reduction in his support obligation as compared to what he would have been obliged to pay
had the child lived primarily with one parent. Legal custody, which determines decision-making
rights, may again be assigned to one parent or shared. The legal custody assignment does not typically affect support obligations, however.
Among the families in our sample, mothers were awarded primary physical and legal custody in
94.2% of cases in which a custody order was made.99 Fathers obtained primary physical and legal
custody in only 2.4% of cases and shared custody in .3%; father custody was less likely than a custody award to a third party (3.1%).100
Mothers failed to obtain primary custody primarily when they were unable to perform parenting
functions: 45% of father or third-party custody cases involved a mother who was imprisoned or
who had a known alcohol or drug addiction problem, and 51% involved a mother with at least one
substantiated child-maltreatment report. Shared custody was ordered in only two cases, one of
which involved split custody. Even where the father was awarded visitation amounting to half the
year or more, mothers still, invariably, obtained primary physical and legal custody.101
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Extensive visitation was rare, however. The average number of overnight visits awarded to sample fathers was thirty-three, less than half the average for previously married fathers in Indiana during the same time period.102 Only 21% obtained at least 52 (one night per week) or more visits,
and 68% of fathers were awarded no visitation at all.103 Indiana has enacted parenting-time guidelines explicitly specifying that nonmarital fathers are entitled to the same visitation as marital fathers
so this result does not reﬂect any legal bias against visitation by nonmarital fathers.104
The number of overnight visits awarded to the father was positively related to the value of the
basic total support award,105 the father’s dollar share of the total support obligation, and the focal
child’s male gender106; it was negatively related to the father’s self-representation at the paternity
proceeding, his having failed to appear at the time support and visitation were determined,107 the
value of the ﬁnal child support order,108 the focal child’s history of maltreatment or guardianship,
and an incarceration history for one or both parents. However, these variables explained only about
20% of case variance.109 Prior orders of protection were not signiﬁcantly related to the father’s visiting time110; the low level of visitation thus cannot be explained as a reaction to reported intimatepartner violence (see Table 2).

IV.

SUPPORT AWARD CALCULATION: VALUE AND PREDICTABILITY

Even in the rare cases where mothers did not obtain custody, they were unlikely to be ordered to
pay support. Among the 676 cases in which a support obligation was imposed, fathers were
required to pay support in 96.9%. Thus, our analysis of support orders is conﬁned to paternal
obligations.
The Indiana Support Guidelines use combined parental income, the number of children in the
family, the amount of residential time allocated to each parent, and each parent’s support obligations
for children with other partners to produce a presumptive support value.111 For example, under the
2007 guidelines in effect when sample orders were made,112 when combined parental income is
$150 per week, the parents have one child, and there are no other children with other partners, the
presumptive award value is $22; that value increases to $30 if the couple has two children and $35
if there are three (assuming that, again, the parents have no children with other partners). If the parents were to have combined income of $170 per week, their support obligation would increase to
$28 (one child), $38 (two children), and $48 (three children). The obligor parent’s share of the total
presumptive value is based on his share of total income after credits for obligations to prior children
are subtracted. Health insurance and childcare costs, when relevant, are added to the presumptive
award. If a judge makes a child support award, s/he must justify deviation from the presumptive
award, but the parents may agree to a different support value. Some states provide low-income
Table 2
Predictors of Father Visitation (Number of Overnight Visits: Father Ordered to Pay Support and
Mother Has Primary Custody, N = 647)
Variable
Constant
Parental incarceration
Final CS order ($)
Basic Total CS order ($)
Focal child was male
Father appeared at hearing
Father had no lawyer
Focal child history of maltreatment or guardianship

Beta (Unstand.)

Stand. Error

Beta (Stand.)

T

Signif.

17.264
−17.603
−.613
.452
18.598
20.600
−20.141
−16.746

10.601
5.320
.073
.064
4.745
6.660
6.479
8.503

−.138
−.449
.381
.159
.127
−.126
−.080

1.628
−3.309
−8.406
7.063
3.919
3.093
−3.109
−1.969

.104
.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
.002
.002
.049
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obligors with a self-support reserve or income-based obligation adjustment; the Indiana Support
Guidelines do not. They do specify $12 “as a minimum child support order.” However, they also
state that “there are situations where a $0.00 support order is appropriate.”113
For our sample, the value of child support awards was low, reﬂecting the low incomes of parents.
For cases in which the father was ordered to pay support, the average award was $51.29 weekly, the
median $45 weekly114; 12.2% of obligor fathers were ordered to pay nothing, and 15.7% were
required to pay $10 per week or less; the guidelines “minimum” of $12 was imposed as the ﬁnal
award in only twelve cases (1.8%). The highest award was $330 weekly; only 9.5% of awards were
$100 per week or higher. Unsurprisingly, the value of the ﬁnal child support order was positively
and signiﬁcantly related to both maternal115 and paternal income.116
For cases in which the father’s income was stated as more than zero, awards averaged 19.25% of
his gross income (median value, 16.6%).117 In 25% of cases, awards represented 11.5% of gross
income or less; in 25% of cases, the ratio of award to gross income exceeded 20%. When existing
child support obligations were subtracted from gross income, the average ratio of award to income
increased to 21% (median 17.9%); more than a third (36%) of sample obligors had award-toadjusted-income ratios exceeding 20%.
Under the guidelines, awards should be higher when an obligor has more income and lower
when he has less income, when he has other children that he is supporting, and when he has more
residential time with the child(ren) subject to a support award. All of these legislatively prescribed
variables were, for our sample, highly signiﬁcant predictors of award value; after stepwise regression analysis, the father’s income, total parental income, the father’s parenting days, the number of
children to be supported by the order, and the credit the father received for supporting other children were all signiﬁcant at the .001 conﬁdence level. The fact that the mother’s income was probably imputed and a parental history of mental health problems or drug/alcohol abuse also survived
regression analysis. Together, these variables explained almost two-thirds of the variance in support
awards (see Table 3).118
The relatively robust predictability of support calculation in St. Joseph County suggests, at ﬁrst
blush, that the Support Guidelines are applied in a fair and consistent manner. But there is reason to
be skeptical that this is in fact the case.
First, recall that the incomes of about half of fathers and mothers appear to be imputed or, in plain
English, invented. When income is imputed to a parent, it is impossible to determine how much cash
the parent actually has coming in or how much he could realistically pay in child support.
Second, the credits both fathers and mothers receive for other support obligations may signiﬁcantly alter award values, and they are quite variable. Consider these examples119: Father A, with
$262 (likely imputed) weekly income and four children by two other mothers, received a $101
credit; Father B, again with $262 (likely imputed) weekly income and ﬁve children by one other
mother, received a $0 credit; and Father C, again with $262 listed income and with four children by
three mothers, received a $50 credit. This variation is explicable, in large part, by whether prior support orders are known to support enforcement ofﬁcials and, if so, the amount the prior order
Table 3
Predictors of Child Support Obligation Value (Fathers Ordered to Pay Support, N = 656)
Variable
(Constant)
Father’s gross income ($)
Parenting time (days)
Children supported this order (#)
Father’s child support credit ($)
Total parental income ($)
Mother’s income imputed at minimum wage
Parental history drugs/alcohol/mental problems

Beta (Unstand.)

Stand. Error

Beta (Stand.)

T

Signif.

−4.170
.139
−.209
10.329
−.126
.024
−6.634
−5.724

3.738
.009
.020
1.447
.023
.006
2.281
2.351

.662
−.271
.188
−.144
.173
−.075
−.064

−1.116
14.658
−10.323
7.138
−5.471
3.838
−2.909
−2.435

.265
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
.004
.015
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required the father to pay (which will, in turn, reﬂect the incomes (or imputed incomes) of the
father and other mother on the date the earlier order was entered). Thus, Father A’s $101 credit
reﬂects the two prior support orders to which he was subject when the sample order was entered;
these orders total $101, the exact value of his credit. Father B received a $0 credit because his ﬁve
children were unknown to the IV-D staff. They lived out of state and their mother did not succeed
in obtaining a support order against Father B until four years after entry of the order in our sample
case. Father C received only a $50 credit because that was the value of the support order for two of
his children for whom support orders had been entered; his parental rights had already been terminated to one of his other children, ending his support obligation. We cannot say why the other support order was ignored because it was missing from the ﬁle; possibly that is the reason it did not
produce a credit. The ﬁle with the missing support order did contain reams of support-enforcement
data; we can conﬁdently say that the father’s arrearage on this order at the time the 2008 order was
entered was $69,000 and counting. However, one cannot suppose that the arrearage is why the order
did not produce a credit; Father C was also in arrears on the order for which he received a $50
credit. At the time the order in our sample case was entered, he owed $2,995, and his driver’s
license had been suspended. Father A, who received a $101 credit, was also in arrears ($1,734) on
one order to which he was subject at the time the sample order was entered. In the other case (as in
ours), Father A’s support obligation was reduced to zero shortly after entry due to his incarceration;
as a result, arrears did not accumulate. We have described only three of 688 cases, but these three
cases are typical of what we saw throughout the sample. Almost invariably, support credits were
based on the values stated in prior support orders, without regard to payment history.
The high level of award predictability in our sample thus appears to reﬂect, to a very large
extent, the routinization of support calculation rather than genuinely consistent treatment of like
cases. The awards produced by this methodology thus rest, for what is probably a large portion of
the sample, more on wishful thinking than economic reality: fathers were assumed to have incomes
when they were likely unemployed; they were assumed to pay prior support obligations when it was
clear that they were not doing so. Even the credits fathers obtained for overnight visits may not
reﬂect reality. A large percentage of unmarried fathers signiﬁcantly reduce their visitation with prior
children after moving on to new relationships.120 In our sample, the number of overnight visits
awarded to the father was a signiﬁcant predictor of a later motion to increase the support order,121
suggesting that many sample fathers did not in fact use their visitation time. In sum, consistency in
sample support orders appear to represent the consistently rote application of rules ungrounded in
the real-life circumstances of support obligors and their children.
V.

SUPPORT NONPAYMENT AND ENFORCEMENT

Slightly more than half (51.3%) of sample fathers’ support orders were not fully paid. Arrearage
values were enormously varied, ranging from $58 to $60,355. For those cases with an arrearage,
the average value was $6,507, the median $4,365.
The size of the arrearage was signiﬁcantly and positively related to the value of the original
order, the number of children to which the order applied, and the father’s likely imputed income.
Arrearage value was negatively related to parental reconciliation and a 2010 petition year. None of
these relationships is particularly surprising. Imputed income is less likely to represent ability to
pay than real wages; a higher value award will produce a larger arrearage when unpaid, and a later
decision creates a shorter time over which an arrearage can build.
Petition year is also signiﬁcant because the lower, $104 imputed-income ﬁgure was used only in
2010, and the $104-imputed-income cases were much less likely to produce arrearages than highervalue (minimum-wage) imputed income cases. For fathers with income imputed at $104, 57% had
no arrearage and 75% had an arrearage of $1,500 or less; the group mean was $1,204, the median
$0. For fathers with income imputed at the minimum wage, only 35% had no arrearage and 46%
had an arrearage of $1,500 or less; the group mean was $3,494, the median $1,895.122
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Surprisingly, however, arrearage value was not signiﬁcantly correlated with either the percentage
of gross income the obligor was required to pay in support or the percentage adjusted for prior support obligations.123 It is also notable that neither the father’s income nor his other children (the existence of other families, number of families, or number of children), although signiﬁcantly
correlated with the size of his arrearage, survived regression analysis as predictive variables. The
total number of residential moves the father was known to have made did survive regression analysis as a predictive variable, however (see Table 4).124
Regression analysis predicted less than 20% of arrearage-value variance, however.125 Again,
what contributes to the growth of arrears for low-income fathers like those in our sample is largely
unexplained by our data.
We also analyzed the value of arrears for the smaller group of cases in which the arrearage value
was greater than zero. Using regression analysis, these variables explained slightly more than a
quarter of case variance.126 For this group, the proportion of obligor gross income represented by
the support obligation (both adjusted for prior support obligations and unadjusted), the number of
children supported by the order, parental reconciliation, the father’s total known moves, his identiﬁcation as African American, and the petition year were predictive.

VI. SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
Arrearages were typically followed by support enforcement proceedings. 48.9% of paternal support obligors in our sample—97% of those with an arrearage—were subject to one or another type
of enforcement action. Enforcement proceedings were, unsurprisingly, strongly related to the size of
a father’s arrearage. Logistic regression analysis eliminated all other variables as predictors but predicted only a modest amount of case variance.127 Enforcement was far more predictable, of course,
when zero-arrearage cases were included. Logistic regression analysis for this larger group
explained two-thirds to nine-tenths of case variance (see Table 5).128
The most typical type of enforcement action was a contempt proceeding, which threatens the obligor
in arrears with jail if he fails to pay some stated sum. Contempt proceedings were brought in 83% of
enforcement cases.129 Indeed, contempt proceedings were often brought multiple times in a single case.
We found that 25.8% of enforcement cases involved two contempt petitions and 12.7% three or more.
By contrast, other forms of support enforcement—driver’s license suspension, asset attachment,
tax refund interception, and wage garnishment—were relatively rare. These enforcement techniques
were used in only 30.1% of enforcement cases.
The reason for contempt being favored over other enforcement techniques is fairly straightforward: a very high percentage of the obligors in our sample did not have jobs that produced regular
paychecks which could be garnished, tax refunds that might be intercepted, assets that could be
attached, or passports that might be revoked; approximately half of paternal incomes were invented
through income imputation. It is possible that driver’s license suspension might have been more
Table 4
Dollar Value of Child Support Arrearage (Father Ordered to Pay Support, $0 Arrearage Included,
N = 617)
Variable
(Constant)
Father’s total known moves
Children supported this order
2010 petition year
Final CS order ($)
Parents reconciled
Father’s imputed income is minimum wage

Beta (Unstand.)

Stand. Error

Beta (Stand.)

T

Signif.

−1458.768
367.728
1547.933
−1762.773
22.414
−2475.906
1495.229

673.863
55.507
308.467
474.150
5.309
682.576
497.757

.251
.193
−.138
.159
−.138
.115

−2.165
6.625
5.018
−3.718
4.222
−3.627
3.004

.031
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
.003
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Table 5
Dollar Value of Child Support Arrearage (Father Ordered to Pay Support, $0 Arrearages Excluded,
N = 293)
Beta
(Unstand.)

Variable
(Constant)
% of obligor income paid in support (adjusted prior
orders)
2010 petition year
% of obligor income paid in support (unadjusted)
Children supported this order
Parents reconciled
Father’s total known moves
Father is African American

Stand.
Error

Beta
(Stand.)

T

Signif.

896.146
44361.350

1162.488
6506.652

.594

.771
6.818

.441
<.001

−3345.450
−27283.823
1899.315
−2893.830
220.911
−1592.457

760.082
7247.993
489.337
1256.123
83.837
781.733

−.216
−.327
.214
−.123
.132
−.102

−4.401
−3.764
3.881
−2.304
2.635
−2.037

<.001
<.001
<.001
.022
.009
.043

widely utilized, but in checking conviction data for our sample, we discovered that many obligors
had had drivers’ licenses suspended or revoked for other reasons. Other obligors were in prison
where they could not use a driver’s license, and some obligors undoubtedly had failed to obtain
one. Likely, even license suspension is unavailable as a useful enforcement technique for a fairly
large percentage of obligors.
What is less clear from our data is why local IV-D staff vigorously pursue some obligors with
multiple contempt petitions and largely ignore others. Ability to pay does not seem to be a motivating factor. For the group of fathers with arrearages (the only candidates for enforcement action),
paternal income was not signiﬁcantly correlated with the number of enforcement proceedings.130
The size of the arrearage, value of the ﬁnal order, the father’s having imputed income at the
minimum-wage level, and the father’s total known moves were all positively correlated with the
number of contempt petitions. These variables predicted slightly more than 30% of variance in the
number of contempt proceedings (see Table 6).131
The Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Turner v. Rogers,132 requiring “procedures that ensure a
fundamentally fair determination of the critical incarceration-related question, whether the supporting parent is able to comply with the support order,” had no apparent impact on local contempt
practice. The sample included ﬁfty-seven cases with orders entered in 2011 or later with arrearages.
Both the mean and median number of contempt actions per year was slightly higher for this postTurner group than for cases with earlier order dates.133 Nor is any difference in practice apparent in
the case ﬁles. Indeed, post-Turner as well as pre-Turner, contempt orders were entered on default in
a high percentage of cases, completely precluding any individualized inquiry.
Given the typical lack of other alternatives, it is easy to see why contempt proceedings are
widely used. But our data demonstrate that this tempting remedy is not effective in the vast majority
of cases in which it is used. The maximum collected—in a case with an arrearage totaling
Table 6
Predictors of Contempt Proceedings Number (Father Pays Support, Arrearage Greater than Zero
Dollars, N = 330)
Variable
(Constant)
Arrearage value ($)
Final CS Order ($)
Father’s imputed income is minimum wage
Father’s total known moves

Beta (Unstand.)
.693
6.955E-5
−.006
.443
.037

Stand. Error

Beta (Stand.)

T

Signif.

.141
.000
.001
.116
.013

.450
−.216
.191
.145

4.905
8.855
−4.229
3.835
2.901

<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
.004

534 FAMILY COURT REVIEW

$18,878—was $6,500. The median value of support collected after contempt proceedings were
brought was a mere $428.92, and absolutely nothing—$0—was collected in 58.3% of contempt
proceeding cases. Even when fathers did pay, it was simply to avoid or escape jail. Almost invariably, arrears began to grow again as soon as the father was released.
Contempt proceedings might also represent an effort to deter further childbearing by obligors
who cannot or will not meet their current support obligations. But, to the extent that contempt proceedings were motivated by such a goal, they did not work. Among sample fathers, having children
with other mothers after entry of the support order was signiﬁcantly and positively correlated both
with the initiation of support enforcement134 and the number of contempt proceedings135 brought.
We do not mean to suggest, of course, that contempt proceedings caused further child bearing. But
neither did they deter it.
VII.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS

We can unequivocally say that St. Joseph County’s child support system is broken. In our sample, fathers were rarely awarded more than token visitation and virtually never awarded joint legal
custody, despite the well-established beneﬁts of contact with both parents. Income was routinely
imputed to parents at a minimum-wage level without any effort to assess actual earning capacity or
to assist the obligor in building work qualiﬁcations and obtaining employment. Fathers’ existing
support obligations were credited at face value, perversely incentivizing nonpayment. Enforcement
proceedings were initiated without any assessment of either the reason an arrearage has accrued or
obligor capacity to make current and make-up payments. Contempt proceedings were routinely utilized for enforcement despite their lack of efﬁcacy, high cost, and potential for causing obligors to
go underground and discontinue or limit contact with their children. In sum, child support practice
in St. Joseph County promotes limited contact between children and their absent fathers, nonpayment of prior support obligations, and the accrual of arrears that can never be paid. A lot of taxpayer money is spent in pursuit of these irrational goals.
We are not, of course, the ﬁrst to criticize routinized overuse of income imputation and contempt
proceedings. It is these very practices that the new federal regulations, just now effective, were
designed to curb. Our study unequivocally supports the need for these new rules and their emphasis
on individualized assessment of both income and capacity to pay when arrearages develop. It also
supports the current policy shift away from costly, ineffectual contempt proceedings and toward
job-skills and employment training. Such programs should, in our view, be mandatory for all obligors who are incarcerated or in residential treatment programs and highly incentivized for high-risk,
unemployed obligors living in the community. Designing programs that work will not be easy or
cheap, of course. But an investment in training makes much more sense than an investment in ineffective threats of jail. In our view, savings from reduced reliance on contempt proceedings should
be quantiﬁed and dedicated to the development of best practices skills training and employment
programs.
Our data also support additional changes in support practice. In this brief article, we can only
outline further directions for reform. But, just as our data demonstrate the need for the reforms currently in progress, we believe that they also demonstrate the inadequacy of these reforms.
First, our data demonstrate the need to extend individualized assessment to support crediting. It
is perverse to equally credit payment obligations when a father pays everything and when he pays
nothing. This sort of routinization unfairly penalizes fathers who do pay. It also incentivizes the
accumulation of new support obligations.
Second, our data demonstrate that changes in parenting-time allocation and custody assignment
are necessary adjuncts to shifts in support rules. As we noted above, researchers have found again
and again that the payment of both formal and informal support is signiﬁcantly correlated with parenting time. Parents are more likely to support children with whom they have lived for substantial
periods and those whom they see frequently after separation136; fathers’ contact with children is
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also associated with less hardship in the child’s household.137 While it is unclear whether visitation
promotes support payment or whether other factors promote both outcomes, it is clear that, unless
contact exposes the child to high levels of parental conﬂict, children who spend meaningful
amounts of time with both parents tend to do better than children who do not.138
Researchers have found that income is signiﬁcantly correlated with shared parenting and visitation time, both when parents divorce and when they separate; higher income is associated with
more shared parenting.139 Our ﬁndings are consistent with this earlier research. But there is no evidence that children of low-income parents beneﬁt less from visitation than do children of highincome parents.
Given the various advantages to children associated with meaningful father contact, we believe
that IV-D agencies must develop policies that ensure children enjoy signiﬁcant amounts of time
with nonresidential fathers except in cases where such visitation would be harmful.140 There is simply no excuse for the fact that two thirds of sample fathers were awarded literally no overnight visits
with their children. Nor is there any possible excuse for the lack of shared physical and legal custody orders in our sample.141 In contrast to some states, the courts that hear paternity and related
child support matters in Indiana are not precluded from addressing custody and visitation.142 To the
contrary, visitation time is included on the child support worksheet that the local IV-D agency utilizes. Moreover, although intimate-partner violence is a common cause of relationship dissolution
in low-income, nonmarital families like those that we studied,143 prior orders of protection were not
signiﬁcantly correlated with the number of visitation days awarded to fathers in our sample.144 This
good reason for restricting visitation cannot explain the low level of visitation awarded fathers and
the lack of joint custody orders.
Guidelines, like those already in effect in Indiana,145 which specify that unmarried fathers have
the same visitation rights as married fathers, are clearly inadequate to promote the routine award of
meaningful visitation time. More robust legislation is needed. Legislative action should be preceded, however, by more research on the sources of current visitation awards and on the effects of
different statutory regimes.146 While the signiﬁcant associations between visitation time and the
father’s failure to appear at the hearing and lack of a lawyer both suggest that court practice plays
an important role in producing the outcomes we have documented, other factors may well be at
work, too. For example, fathers in our sample had a high level of residential instability; a signiﬁcant
number may not have housing adequate for overnight visits. Visitation schedules could be altered to
take daytime visitation into account. Some states already follow this approach,147 which might serve
the valuable purpose of facilitating maternal employment as well as paternal visitation. New legislation is necessary, but it should be guided by research into the needs of families like those in our
sample and the causes of visitation awards like those that predominated in our sample.
Finally, our data demonstrate the difﬁculties in moving beyond routine income imputation in a
way that meets the competing goals of fairness and payment incentivization. Certainly, pass-through
laws that incentivize payment by low-income obligors should be universal. In our view, obligors
should also receive credit for in-kind support, assuming that the custodial parent is content with this
form of contribution. Child support worksheets could easily be reformulated to take such contributions into account, and both parents could easily be involved in a discussion of how much support
should be paid in-kind and in cash. In appropriate cases, fathers could also be given credit for childcare that facilitates maternal employment.
A self-support reserve for low-income obligors would also be valuable. Such a reserve would
recognize the obligor’s legitimate subsistence needs, reduce the likelihood of impossible-to-pay
awards, and potentially create incentives for legal, higher-wage employment.
However, formulating rules that appropriately impute income to unemployed fathers—rules that
are easy to use, consistently produce support obligations that can be met, and promote parent–child
contact, parental harmony, and employment—will not be easy. Further, while the new regulations
demanding individualized assessment are needed and overdue, an individualized-assessment mandate will not, by itself, produce altered results any more than did the Indiana statute, specifying that
nonmarital parents have the same visitation rights as marital parents or the Supreme Court’s
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decision in Turner v. Rogers. Neither the statute nor Turner had any apparent effect on case processing in our sample, and there is no reason to expect that the new federal mandate will achieve more.
The law on the books is simply not the same as the law in action.
It is also far from clear how the harried IV-D attorney, burdened with a caseload numbering in
the hundreds, typically confronted with obligors who have minimal work experience, poor job qualiﬁcations, and a range of problems—prior incarceration, a history of drug abuse or alcoholism, lack
of a car, and mental and/or physical impairments—is supposed to translate the individualizedinquiry mandate into an individualized dollars-and-cents number. The problems are legion. In some
cases, the obligor will not even be present; 9.5% of fathers in our sample defaulted. Very few will
have legal representation. Only 15.4% of sample fathers and 12.1% of sample mothers were represented by counsel; in only 6.5% of cases were both parties represented. Moreover, of course, lawyer
representation is most rare in cases of imputed income; parent with imputed income typically lack
money to pay a lawyer. 20.2% of fathers without imputed income were represented by counsel as
compared to 8.8% of fathers with imputed income.
Checklists and similar decision-making tools are unlikely to be adequate. Assume the typical
candidate for imputed income, an unemployed obligor with no special skills, a high school education, who has not worked in the past year, and has no work experience beyond minimum-wage
employment; the obligor is not clearly disabled. Then consider one such decision-making tool,
which requires the imputation decision maker to take into account:
a. The parent’s prior employment experience;
b. The parent’s education;
c. The parent’s physical and mental disabilities, if any;
d. The availability of employment in the geographic area in which the parent resides;
e. The prevailing wage and salary levels in the geographic area in which the parent resides;
f. The parent’s special skills and training;
g. Whether there is evidence that the parent has the ability to earn the imputed income;
h. The age and special needs of the child subject to the child support order…;
i. The parent’s increased earning capacity because of experience;
j. The parent’s decreased earning capacity because of a felony conviction; or
k. Any other relevant factor.148
Using these factors, how much income should be imputed to the obligor? The answer is almost
certainly a minimum-wage income, the very same value that decision makers now turn to. There is
no basis for assuming more income and, given the obligor’s lack of a disability, no particular basis
for assuming less. There is, of course, the fact that the obligor is not working and has not been
working. But unless the local unemployment rate is particularly high, why shouldn’t the decision
maker assume that reasonable effort would turn up a minimum-wage job?
Should we do away with income imputation for cases like this one? The advantage of a noimputation strategy is that the obligor will not accumulate arrears. He may also be more motivated to
spend time with his child if he does not feel hounded by the support enforcement agency. However,
the large disadvantage of assuming that all unskilled, unemployed obligors have no earning capacity
is that their incentives to obtain employment and better job skills are markedly reduced. Moreover,
the research evidence demonstrates that most low-income fathers do have some income. Here, fathers
with imputed income often developed arrearages, but most also made some payments. Moreover,
researchers have found that about half of fathers make in-kind contributions and informal payments
to mothers.149 In one study, support paid informally to mothers averaged $175 per month.150 Where
does the money come from? Researchers who have reported on in-kind contributions do not detail
the sources of paternal income and our study, too, offers no data on this important question. At this
point, it is fair to say that we simply don’t know how much the typical “unemployed” obligor brings
in, let alone what he could realistically earn in the legal, wage economy.
Our research data do demonstrate that low-value imputed income is far less likely to produce
arrearages than minimum-wage-level imputed income. For fathers with income imputed at $104,
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57% had no arrearage and 75% had an arrearage of $1500 or less; for fathers with income imputed
at the minimum wage, only 35% had no arrearage and only 46% had an arrearage of $1500 or less.
The average arrearage value of the minimum-wage group was also close to triple that of the $104
group.151 This difference strongly supports an approach, for disadvantaged fathers like those in our
sample, that minimizes the level at which income is imputed. Support enforcement proceedings are
costly and largely ineffectual for this group. There is no obvious value in using an unrealistic, ﬁctional income value to produce an award that will not be paid and will cost the state money for
futile collection efforts.
Beyond these basics, we think more research is needed. Likely, the best approach would test
multiple income-imputation models over time to come up with the most workable approach.
As the states turn their attention to meeting the requirements of the new federal regulations, they
will be tempted to rely on factor lists, like the one we quoted, and whitewash the difﬁculty of applying it. We hope that, instead, they honestly confront the difﬁculties of compliance and avoid this
road to failure.
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